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Introduction  
Some of the central questions that have been explored by Latin American and Latinx 
philosophers are questions of metaphilosophy. “Metaphilosophy” refers to philosophical 
reflections on the nature of philosophy itself. For example, we might ask: What is the purpose of 
doing philosophy? How does philosophy compare and contrast with other disciplines, such as 
science, theology, or literature? And what is the best way of categorizing the different kinds and 
traditions of philosophy? These are philosophical questions about philosophy as an activity and 
as a discipline.  
 
In this chapter, we discuss some ways that Latin American and Latinx philosophers have 
addressed these and other metaphilosophical issues. Our focus will be on the following 
questions: What are the defining characteristics of “Latin American philosophy” and “Latinx 
philosophy”? Do they constitute distinctive traditions of philosophy, and if so, what is especially 
valuable about these traditions? In section one, we begin by examining the views of 
philosophers who are skeptical of Latin American philosophy. Many of these writers argue that 
the philosophy that has been produced in Latin America is not original or authentic enough to 
constitute a distinctive philosophical tradition that can stand alongside other, more established 
traditions of philosophy, such as ancient Greek philosophy and European philosophy. In section 
two, we examine the opposing views of those who defend Latin American philosophy as an 
original, authentic, and distinctively valuable tradition of thought. In section three, we turn to 
similar questions that have been raised about the nature of Latinx philosophy.  
 
As we will see, metaphilosophical writings on the nature of Latin American and Latinx 
philosophy shed light on a number of other issues, such as Latin American and Latinx identity 
and the legacy of colonialism. And the inquiry is not over: Latin American and Latinx 
philosophy are alive today and continue to evolve, even as we speak of them. Thus, this chapter 
does not aim to provide any definitive answers to these questions. Instead, we hope that this 
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chapter will help to orient, challenge, and inspire philosophers to reflect on—and even 
participate in shaping—the future of Latin American and Latinx philosophy.  
 
The Questions of Originality and Authenticity 
Let us begin with a metaphilosophical examination of Latin American philosophy. Our central 
question here is: What are the defining characteristics of Latin American philosophy? One way 
that Latin American philosophers have addressed this question is to examine the philosophy that 
has been produced by Latin American thinkers and try to identify common characteristics of this 
philosophy that are original and authentic. In other words, they have broken this question down 
into two more specific questions:  
● The Question of Originality—When we look at the philosophy produced in Latin 
America, what, if anything, can be identified that is significantly different from what can 
be found in other philosophical traditions?  
● The Question of Authenticity—When we look at the philosophy produced in Latin 
America, what, if anything, can be identified that is distinctively Latin American—i.e., an 
organic expression of the unique life-experiences, concerns, styles, and perspectives of 
the people of Latin America? 
The Questions of Originality and Authenticity are usually framed by comparing the philosophy 
produced in Latin America to the philosophy produced in Europe and, more recently, the U.S. In 
this way, these questions reflect a worry that some Latin American philosophers have shared: Is 
the philosophy that has been produced in Latin America merely an imitation of European or 
Anglo-American philosophy?  
 
The Skeptics  
A provocative challenge for Latin American philosophers 
Writing in the 1920s, a century after the Peruvian War of Independence from Spain, the Peruvian 
philosopher José Carlos Mariátegui hoped that Latin American philosophy would develop into a 
world-renowned philosophical tradition.1 However, Mariátegui worried that excessive optimism 
about the challenges faced by Latin America would make Latin Americans complacent. In order 
to inspire his fellow Latin American philosophers to work hard to live up to their potential, 
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Mariátegui articulated the Questions of Originality and Authenticity in a deliberately provocative 
and challenging way. He asked: Does a Latin American tradition of philosophy even exist?  
 
In his 1924 essay, “Is There Such a Thing as Hispanic-American Thought?” Mariátegui warns 
that it would be premature to claim that a distinctive tradition of thought had developed in Latin 
America. The reason, he argues, is that in spite of the political independence from Europe that 
had been achieved in Latin America and elsewhere, Europe still had a pervasive and profound 
influence on Latin American philosophy. He explains: 
The existence in Western culture of French thought, of German thought, seems evident to 
me. The existence of Hispanic-American thought in the same sense does not seem 
equally evident. All the thinkers of our America have been educated in European schools. 
The spirit of the race is not felt in their work. The continent’s intellectual production 
lacks its own characteristics. It does not have an original profile. Hispanic-American 
thought is generally only a rhapsody composed from the motifs and elements of 
European thought.2 
 
Over forty years later, a similarly skeptical view of Latin American philosophy was  deployed by 
fellow Peruvian philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy. In his essay, “The Meaning and Problem of 
Hispanic American Thought” (1969), Salazar Bondy chronicles European influence over the 
course of Latin America’s intellectual history:  
...what we find in all our countries is a succession of imported doctrines, a procession of 
systems which follows European, or, in general, foreign unrest. It is almost a succession 
of intellectual fashions without roots in our spiritual life and, for this very reason, lacking 
the virtue of fertility…. For this reason these systems were abandoned as quickly and 
easily as they were embraced, having been chosen by the upper class and the intellectual 
sectors of Hispanic Americans according to their immediate preferences and momentary 
affinities. To review the process of Hispanic American philosophy is to relate the passing 
of Western philosophy through our countries, or to narrate European philosophy in 
Hispanic America. It is not to tell the history of a natural philosophy of Hispanic 
America. In our historical process there are Cartesians, Krausists, Spencerians, 
Bergsonians, and other European “isms.” But this is all; there are no creative figures to 
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found and nurture their own peculiar tradition, nor native philosophic “isms.” We search 
for the original contributions of our countries in answer to the Western challenge—or to 
that of other cultures—and we do not find it.3 
Salazar Bondy concludes that in the philosophy that has been produced in Latin America, there is 
an absence of an original and authentic style of philosophical inquiry—or as he puts it, an 
“[a]bsence of a characteristic, definitive tendency, and of an ideological, conceptual proclivity 
capable of founding a tradition of thought” (MP, 388). 
 
The lack of originality and authenticity that characterizes Latin American philosophy, Salazar 
Bondy argues, is a result of the fact that Latin American philosophers have been alienated from 
the rest of their communities.   
There has existed permanently in Hispanic America a great distance between those who 
practice philosophy and the whole of the community. There is no way to consider our 
philosophies of national thought, with a differential seal, as one speaks of a German, 
French, English, or Greek philosophy. It is almost impossible for the community to 
recognize itself in these philosophies, precisely because we are dealing with transplanted 
thought, the spiritual products of other men and other cultures, which a refined minority 
makes an effort to understand and to share. (MP, 389) 
From his perspective, philosophical works must represent the communities out of which they 
emerge if they are to be authentic. People should recognize themselves––their own history, 
struggles, and concerns––when they read these works. Instead, Salazar Bondy finds that there is 
a gulf between the philosophy that is being produced by a small number of elites in Latin 
America and the vast majority of people who live there. In his words: 
The distance between those who practice philosophy and the community at large is in this 
case—unlike the normal relationship between the specialist and the public—the abyss 
between the enlightened elite who live according to a foreign model, and the illiterate, 
poverty-stricken masses, trapped in the framework of remote and sclerotic traditions. 
(MP, 396)  
Thus, according to Salazar Bondy, philosophy throughout the history of Latin America has not 
emerged from the lived experience of Latin American people but, rather, has been transplanted 
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from another culture. As he puts it, “It has been a plagiarized novel and not the truthful chronicle 
of our human adventure” (MP, 392). 
 
Deeper connections between philosophy, culture, and colonization  
If this skeptical view of Latin American philosophy is correct, we might wonder: Why would 
philosophers in Latin America have drawn from European philosophy so heavily, rather than 
seeking inspiration in the perspectives and insights within their own communities?  
 
In answer to this question, Mariátegui argues that although Latin American countries had 
achieved political independence from European colonizers, Latin American people were still 
culturally subordinate to Europe and had yet to achieve an independent sense of identity. In his 
view, the blending of races—European and indigenous—that occurred in the Americas during 
the process of colonization had not succeeded in creating a people with a “new soul.”4 Instead, 
Mariátegui argues that in most Latin American countries, the elite have sought to adopt 
European ways of thinking and living, while the people and elements of culture that are more 
closely associated with indigeneity have been denied the highest levels of political and cultural 
expression. Thus, in his assessment, “The elements of our nationality in formation have not yet 
been fused or welded.”5 In order for there to be a characteristically Latin American tradition of 
philosophy, he argues, there needs to be distinctive Latin American peoples, and such a people 
has not yet emerged.  
 
Like Mariátegui before him, Salazar Bondy contends that the reason that Latin American 
philosophy has not authentically reflected Latin American culture is that, in fact, there is no 
authentic Latin American culture. He writes: “A defective and illusory philosophic conscience 
causes one to suspect the existence of a defective and unauthentic social being, the lack of a 
culture in the strong and proper sense of the term… This is the case in Hispanic America” (MP, 
394-95). Salazar Bondy adds that, on his view, the reason that Latin America does not have an 
authentic culture is that colonialism and economic dependence have inhibited its proper 
development. He explains, “As dependents of Spain, England, or the United States, we have 
been and continue to be underdeveloped—if I may use the expression—under these powers, and, 
consequently, countries with a culture of domination” (MP 395).  
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In spite of these findings, both Mariátegui and Salazar Bondy held out hope that philosophy in 
Latin America would become original and authentic in the future. According to Salazar Bondy, 
however, this will only be possible if Latin American philosophers focus on their distinctive 
circumstances:  
Philosophy in Hispanic America has a possibility of being authentic in the midst of the 
unauthenticity that surrounds and consumes it, and to convert itself into the lucid 
awareness of this condition and into the thought capable of unleashing the process to 
overcome it. It must be a meditation about our anthropological status and from our own 
negative status, with a view to its cancellation. (MP  397) 
In other words, Salazar Bondy argues that in order to be authentic, Latin American philosophy 
will need to consist of reflections about the unique social, historical, and political circumstances 
in Latin America, with the aim of eliminating the negative conditions that have kept Latin 
American people from achieving an authentic existence. In fact, he says, philosophy could 
actually be a site in which the people of Latin America transcend their condition of subordination 
and begin to imagine new ways of living. As he puts it, “Being the focus of man’s total 
awareness, [philosophy] could, better than other spiritual creations, be that part of humanity that 
rises above itself, and overcomes the negativity of the present as it moves toward new and 
superior forms of reality” (MP, 397). In this way, Salazar Bondy hopes that the formation of an 
authentic Latin American philosophical tradition—together with greater economic independence 
in the region—could provide an essential impetus for the emergence of an authentic Latin 
American culture. 
 
Two related metaphilosophical questions  
As we have seen, it would be a mistake to assume that those who are skeptical of the originality 
and authenticity of Latin American philosophy are merely naysayers seeking to diminish the 
accomplishments of others. Instead, skeptics like Mariátegui and Salazar Bondy are motivated by 
a sincere belief in the greater potential of Latin American philosophy and culture, and in the 
course of presenting their provocative analyses, they develop some creative and thought-




Let us highlight two other areas in which those who raise doubts about Latin American 
philosophy have made significant philosophical contributions. The first area concerns the 
question of how philosophy itself should be defined. This issue was addressed by the Argentine 
philosopher Risieri Frondizi in his 1949 essay, “Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?” 
Frondizi begins this essay by putting forward a skeptical view of Latin American philosophy, 
saying, “Up to the present, Ibero-American philosophy is simply the rethinking of the European 
problems that have reached our shores.”6 This view should be familiar to us by now (for a related 
discussion of Frondizi’s essay, see chapter 5). But in the course of supporting his conclusion, 
Frondizi takes a different route, and he encounters a fascinating and difficult question of 
metaphilosophy, which we can call the Question of Form and Purpose.  
● The Question of Form and Purpose—Is the purpose of philosophical writing different 
from the purpose of other kinds of writing, such as poetry and literature? If so, should 
philosophical writing take on a distinctive form that is suited to its distinctive purpose?   
The way we answer the Question of Form and Purpose will influence how we answer the 
Questions of Originality and Authenticity. After all, Latin American literature is widely admired 
as being both original and authentic, and at least some of this literature addresses philosophical 
issues in insightful ways. For example, the Argentine author Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986) 
wrote short stories and poems that take up positions held by well-known philosophers throughout 
history and suggest novel approaches to traditional philosophical questions about topics such as 
the nature of time, infinity, memory, writing, and religion. The same could be said of many other 
Latin Americans whose writings are philosophical but do not fit the traditional Western 
philosophical mold. Thus, if this sort of writing counts as genuine philosophy, then this gives us 
reason to conclude that an original and authentic tradition of Latin American philosophy already 
exists.  
 
Frondizi argues, however, that we ought to make a sharp distinction between philosophy and 
poetry, literature, political speeches, and other non-philosophical forms. Genuine philosophy, he 
says, is presented in a way that prioritizes philosophical concerns. Thus, philosophy aims for 
clarity of argumentation and analysis, while, in contrast, the writings of poets, novelists, and 
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statesmen are shaped by other concerns and goals, such as creating beauty, telling a good story, 
or nation-building. As Frondizi puts it,  
it is undeniable that the works of [the Latin American authors] Sarmiento, Bello, or 
Martí—to mention three great examples—contain philosophical ideas. But such ideas 
appear as a result of literary or political concerns to which they remain subordinated. In 
none of them does philosophy have an independent status; none of them set forth 
philosophical problems motivated by philosophical interests. We are, of course, not 
reproaching them for this; their work fills us with satisfaction and admiration…. We only 
wish to point out what seems an undeniable fact: that philosophy has been subordinated 
to non-philosophical interests.7  
After making this sharp distinction between philosophy and non-philosophy—and thus setting 
aside the work of any Latin American writer who does not write in a traditional philosophical 
form, regardless of how creative or insightful it may be—Frondizi concludes that Latin 
American philosophy lacks both originality and authenticity.  
 
Frondizi’s answer to the Question of Form and Purpose may not persuade everyone; indeed, we 
will examine some opposing views shortly. But by clearly articulating this question and showing 
its connection to the larger questions about the defining characteristics of Latin American 
philosophy, Frondizi’s article makes an important contribution to the ongoing conversation about 
the relationship of philosophy to other disciplines of thought.   
 
Another, related area in which skeptics of Latin American philosophy have made positive 
philosophical contributions concerns a question about how to understand what sort of activity 
philosophizing is supposed to be and what philosophy can hope to achieve. We can call this the 
Question of Universality. 
● The Question of Universality — Is philosophy best understood as the search for absolute 
truths which are valid for all people at all times? If so, then what sense does it make to 
talk about the philosophy of a cultural group, e.g. the philosophy of Latin America?  
The Question of Universality has been of interest to philosophers for centuries in both Latin 
America and Europe. One scholar to pose this question as it relates to Latin American 
philosophy is U.S. philosopher Vicente Medina. In his 1992 article, “The Possibility of an 
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Indigenous Philosophy: A Latin American Perspective,” Medina defends a universalist view of 
philosophy, arguing that philosophy seeks to discover universal truths. He thus rejects the 
historicist view that philosophy is best understood as the articulation of the various worldviews 
of individuals and cultures throughout history. The upshot of Medina’s argument in favor of 
universalism is that the skeptics are correct that there is no such thing as Latin American 
philosophy. The reason is that, on his view, philosophy is, in all cases, universal, and so 
philosophizing is not inherently tied in any way to a particular society, culture, or historical 
situation.  
 
To better understand what is at stake in the debate between the universalist and the historicist, let 
us compare philosophy to two other activities—mathematics and cooking. According to the 
historicist, philosophy is like cooking, insofar as both activities tend to reflect the historical and 
cultural context of practitioners. For example, Mexican cuisine is shaped by the unique foods 
that are grown in Mexico, as well as the distinctive culinary techniques, styles, and tastes of 
Mexican culture across time. Likewise, the historicist argues, we should expect Latin American 
philosophy to reflect the distinctive features of the historical and cultural context of Latin 
American philosophers.  
 
According to universalists like Medina, however, philosophy is more like mathematics. 
Mathematics is a universal language that allows those who speak it to transcend their concrete, 
historical situation. After all, “2+2=4” is equally true in all cultures and all times, and such 
mathematical truths do not seem to reflect the historical or cultural position of the 
mathematicians who discover them. From this perspective, there is no such thing as Latin 
American mathematics, because Latin American mathematicians cannot put their own distinctive 
spin on mathematical truths like “2+2=4”. Likewise, Medina argues that philosophy seeks to 
discover principles—such as the laws of logic—that are transcultural and objective, and which 
any person can recognize to be true.  
 
According to Medina, when Plato argues for his theory of the state, or Descartes offers his theory 
of knowledge, these philosophers are seeking to articulate universal truths.8 Indeed, all genuinely 
philosophical activity, he says, involves presenting arguments and defending them with reasons 
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that are, in principle, accessible to anyone, and which we can understand and evaluate without 
knowledge of the philosopher’s cultural context. Accordingly, Medina describes his view of 
philosophy this way: 
One may partly understand by the nature of philosophical inquiry the activity of being 
critical and thus argumentative. This means that philosophers present arguments and 
defend them with reasons. These reasons are universally open to inspection to anyone 
who wants to assess them. Both reasons and arguments may be assessed according to the 
principles of sound reasoning: coherence, clarity, and the weight of evidence.9  
 
On this basis, Medina presses a critique of historicism. He argues that if the historicist believes 
that philosophy merely aims to discover relative (not absolute) truths—i.e., basic principles that 
are valid only within a particular historical and cultural context—then this relativism is self-
contradictory: One cannot both advocate for the value of a relativist position in universalist terms 
while rejecting universalism as the ultimate arbiter of truth. As he puts it, if historicists were to 
defend their view of philosophy against the universalist view,  
they would be compelled to appeal at least to some nonarbitrary principle of adjudication 
in order to establish their point. But if this were to be the case, then they would actually 
be supporting, instead of undermining, my argument in favor of [universalism].... Either 
they abide by the principles of sound reasoning...and, therefore, provide ammunition for 
my argument against their...position. Or they give up the principles of sound reasoning 
and, therefore, give up the notion of reasonable argumentation altogether.10 
Again, while Medina’s argument may not persuade everyone, it certainly enriches the ongoing 
discussion about the nature of philosophy—and presents a serious challenge for those who would 
like to defend the existence of Latin American tradition of philosophical thought. 
 
A deflated conception of Latin American philosophy   
In light of the skeptical views we have considered, we may wonder whether it is fruitless  to 
search for characteristics that make the Latin American philosophical tradition different from 
other traditions and authentic to the unique circumstances of the Latin American community. 
Perhaps this idea of an original and authentic tradition of Latin American philosophy is 
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“inflated” and overly idealistic. If so, then maybe the best way to define this tradition is simply 
to say: Latin American philosophy is the philosophy that has been produced in Latin America.   
 
This “deflated” view of Latin American philosophy is defended by the U.S. philosopher Jorge 
J.E. Gracia. According to Gracia, Latin American philosophy is simply the philosophy of the 
Latin American ethnos—that is, the philosophy produced by people of Latin American decent.11 
If Gracia is correct that Latin American philosophy should be defined simply in terms of the 
ethnic group that produces it, then we should not expect there to be any particular view, 
perspective, or style that characterizes this tradition. An ethnic group, Gracia says, is like an 
enormous extended family, and just as with any family, there may not be any particular features 
that all members share. In a similar way, Gracia argues, we should not expect to find anything 
more than a relatively vague “family resemblance” that unites the work of Latin American 
philosophers (compare to Gracia’s view of Hispanic identity, as discussed in the previous 
chapter).  
My view does not identify what characterizes Latin American philosophers because Latin 
American philosophers, just like the members of my family, have no property that 
characterizes all of them at all times and places, even if they have all sorts of properties 
that characterize some of them at some times or places. Indeed, consider such examples 
as Las Casas, Sor Juana, Mariátegui, Ingenieros, and Frondizi. Many efforts have been 
undertaken to find such common properties, and so far they have failed. In my view, this 
search should be abandoned because it is based on a misunderstanding of the familial-
historical character of ethne and their cultural products.12 
Gracia’s deflated conception of Latin American philosophy may be appealing to those who are 
skeptical regarding our ability to identify characteristics of the Latin American philosophical 
tradition that are original and authentic. Gracia’s view highlights the diversity of Latin American 
philosophers, who, while sharing aspects of a common cultural background, have a wide variety 
of views and approaches to philosophy. This kind of skepticism about Latin American 
philosophy is not “negative” or destructive but, rather, is grounded in a celebration of the 
diversity of Latin American philosophy, which makes it impossible to characterize the work of 




The Defenders  
In the previous section, we examined the work of philosophers who doubt that the philosophy 
that has been produced in Latin American constitutes an original and authentic philosophical 
tradition. We saw that in the course of making their arguments, these skeptics identified several 
fascinating metaphilosophical questions regarding philosophy’s relationship to truth, history, 
culture, and other disciplines of thought. In this section, we examine some ways that these same 
questions have been addressed by philosophers who believe that, contrary to what the skeptics 
claim, there does exist a distinctive Latin American tradition of philosophy that is both original 
and authentic.  
 
As we will see, each of these philosophers are put in a position in which they must reflect 
critically on why the existence of Latin American philosophy was called into question in the first 
place. We might even say that these philosophers are forced to engage in “meta-
metaphilosophy”—that is, philosophical inquiry about why certain metaphilosophical questions 
about the nature of philosophy in general, and Latin American philosophy in particular, have 
appeared to be important or vexing to so many philosophers. In this way, defenders of Latin 
American philosophy try to reclaim the metaphilosophical debate over the existence of Latin 
American philosophy as constituting a distinctive line of inquiry that, ironically, actually 
contributes to the originality and authenticity of the Latin American philosophical tradition.  
 
Liberation as the central concern of the tradition 
U.S. philosopher Ofelia Schutte argued in 1987 that a distinctively Latin American tradition of 
philosophy exists, and that this tradition consists of “philosophical studies addressing issues of 
significance to Latin America’s social, cultural, and political history and identity.”13 In 
particular, she says, Latin American philosophy is characterized by a concern for freedom from 
oppression, a concern that reflects Latin America’s history of struggle with colonial and post-
colonial domination.    
…[T]here is one primary reality pervading the thought of every Latin American 
philosopher. This is the issue of dependence and independence. Latin America is not just 
a different part of the world relative to Europe and North America; it is a dependent part 
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of the world. Moreover, dependence—in terms of power—is translatable into 
subordination. So while the Latin American philosopher “thinks being” historically in 
terms of historical being, the structure of the historical situation meeting human reflection 
is one of vulnerability seeking strength, of dependence striving for freedom from 
domination. (LAP, 25)  
Schutte argues that when we look at the work of Latin American philosophers within this 
framework, it becomes possible “to unite a plurality of perspectives and methods which 
otherwise might not appear to be interrelated” (LAP, 26)—and to see this unity as an authentic 
expression of the Latin American experience.  
 
In fact, Schutte argues, the failure to perceive the common concern for freedom from oppression 
that underlies and unites so much of Latin American philosophy reflects a Eurocentric bias and a 
kind of “colonial reasoning.” For example, she says, consider three prominent schools of thought 
in Latin America: “the theology of liberation, the secular theories of human rights, and the 
various forms of Marxism found in Latin America today” (LAP, 26). If we do not see these 
schools as unified in their underlying concern for liberation from oppression, they would appear 
to be “three separate schools of thought, each deriving its philosophical status from its origins 
outside Latin America” (LAP, 26). She continues:  
Liberation theology would be traced back to the theology of Roman Catholicism, human 
rights theory would be traced to the Enlightenment, and Marxist theories to European, or 
more recently, Soviet and Chinese versions of Marxism. In other words, each theory 
would be judged only as a reflection or copy of something originating outside the 
continent. But from the standpoint I am...employing, we can see how these three different 
and distinct schools of thought, modified by certain historical realities in Latin America, 
lead to a new unified theory of value according to the common element they all address: 
namely, the question of the historical and cultural interrelationship of Latin America to 
the rest of the world, the issue of dependence and independence of Latin America vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. (LAP, 26)  
Schutte adds that many of the most prominent Latin American philosophers address the 
distinctive ways that conflicts surrounding Latin American identity have shaped the struggle for 
independence in the region. For example, she says, what we see when we look at the work of the 
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Mexican philosopher Octavio Paz, the Caribbean philosopher Frantz Fanon, or the Argentine 
philosopher Andrés Roig, is this:  
...variations on the theme of how to free oneself from the heritage of inequality and 
exploitation originating with the Conquest and colonialism. Despite almost five hundred 
years of assimilation into Western European tradition, many Latin Americans still feel 
the conflict provoked by the conquistadores’ subjugation and extermination of millions 
of Indians who dwelt in the region. The Indians have come to symbolize the ancient, 
exploited, maternal heritage of the Americans, in contradistinction to the technologically 
advanced, civilized, foreign conqueror. How to resolve this tension in an unalienated and 
authentic manner is one of the challenges of Latin American philosophy today. (LAP, 27)  
From this perspective, even the work of skeptics like Mariátegui and Salazar Bondy—who worry 
that Latin American philosophy is derivative of European or Anglo-American philosophy—
reflect a struggle to achieve independence and an “unalienated” identity, a struggle that Schutte 
argues is a distinctive feature of Latin American philosophy. If this is correct, then, ironically, 
the skeptics’ worry about the inauthenticity of Latin American culture is itself an authentic 
expression of the life-experiences, concerns, and perspectives of the Latin American community.  
 
A defense of historicism 
One of the most notable thinkers to make a case for the existence of an original and authentic 
Latin American philosophical tradition was the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea. In his 1948 
article, “The Actual Function of Philosophy in Latin America,” Zea offers an especially 
insightful analysis of the Question of Universality.  
 
In his article, Zea defends a historicist view of philosophy against the universalist view. In his 
defense of historicism, Zea acknowledges that philosophy often engages with abstract questions 
that are universal, in the sense that every person and culture must address them. However, he 
insists that Latin American philosophers can offer their own distinctive perspective on these 
universal issues, a perspective grounded in their distinctive life-experiences.    
Among such issues are those of being, knowledge, space, time, God, life, death, etc. A 
Latin American philosophy can collaborate with Western culture by attempting to resolve 
the problems posed by the issues that European philosophy has not been able to resolve, 
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or to which it has failed to find a satisfactory solution…. The abstract issues will have to 
be seen from the Latin American man’s own circumstance. Each man will see in such 
issues what is closest to his own circumstance. He will look at these issues from the 
standpoint of his own interests, and those interests will be determined by his way of life, 
his abilities and inabilities, in a word, by his own circumstance. In the case of Latin 
America, his contribution to the philosophy of such issues will be permeated by the Latin 
American circumstance. Hence, when we [Latin Americans] address abstract issues, we 
shall formulate them as issues of our own. Even though being, God, etc., are issues 
appropriate for every man, the solution to them will be given from a Latin American 
standpoint. We may not say what these issues mean for every man, but we can say what 
they mean for us Latin Americans. Being, God, death, etc., would be what these 
abstractions mean for us.14 
In this passage, Zea argues that all philosophy represents—consciously or unconsciously—the 
particular historical circumstances of the philosopher. Thus, on his view, all works of Latin 
American philosophers will express the their own particular concerns, perspective, and style of 
thinking: “The Latin American element will be present in spite of our philosophers’ attempts at 
objectivity. It will be present despite our thinkers’ attempt to depersonalize it” (FPLA, 365).  
 
Zea adds that because Latin American philosophy has been relatively marginalized within the 
discipline, it contains untapped philosophical resources that could become the source of new life 
for the discipline, and indeed, for Western culture as a whole. If so, then Latin American 
philosophers have an opportunity—and perhaps a responsibility—to help shape the future of 
both philosophy and world history.  
From this we can infer yet another goal for a possible Latin American philosophy. The 
Western culture of which we are children and heirs needs new values on which to rest. 
These new values will have to be derived from new human experiences, that is, from the 
experiences that result from men being in the new circumstances of today. Because of its 
particular situation, Latin America can contribute to culture with the novelty of untapped 
experiences. That is why it is necessary that it tell its truth to the world. But it must be a 
truth without pretensions, a sincere truth. Latin America should not pretend to be the 
director of Western culture; what it must aspire to do is to produce culture purely and 
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simply. And that can be accomplished by attempting to resolve the problems that are 
posed to the Latin American man by his own Latin American perspective. (FPLA, 367) 
Zea suggests, for example, that Latin American philosophers are well situated to contribute to 
our philosophical understanding of how to resolve the tension between human individuality and 
sociality.  
Latin American philosophy must begin the task of searching for the values that will 
provide the basis for a future type of culture. And this task will be carried out with the 
purpose of safekeeping the human essence: that which makes a man a man. Now, man is 
essentially an individual who is at the same time engaged in interaction with others, and 
hence it is necessary to maintain a balance between these two components of his essence. 
This is the balance that has been upset to the point of leading man to extremes: 
individualism to the point of anarchy, and social existence to the point of massification. 
Hence it is imperative to find values that make social interaction possible without 
detriment to individuality. (FPLA, 367-68) 
In this article, Zea does not clarify how he envisions Latin American philosophers contributing 
to this particular philosophical line of inquiry, but taken as a whole, his work suggests that when 
Latin American philosophers set out to address universal questions, they will start with the 
challenges posed by the historical legacy of colonization and conquest that characterizes Latin 
American history, and for this reason, they will be in a unique position to offer original and 
authentic insights into these universal philosophical questions. For example, when addressing the 
tension between the individual and society, Latin American philosophers will be in a position to 
interpret this issue in terms of economic, political, and cultural relations of dependence and 
independence. In this way, they can offer a distinctive, politically oriented perspective on 
longstanding philosophical concerns. 
 
Opening the borders of the discipline  
In her essay “Is ‘Latin American Thought’ Philosophy?” (2003), U.S. philosopher Susana 
Nuccetelli takes up each of the metaphilosophical questions we have discussed in order to defend 
the claim that the existing body of works by Latin American philosophers is, indeed, part of a 
distinctive philosophical tradition. To help to settle the issue, Nuccetelli proposes some basic 
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criteria that she hopes both sides can agree on: “A philosophical work is characteristically Latin 
American if and only if: 
(1) it offers original philosophical arguments, and 
(2) it shows that its philosophical topics are in part determined by the relation its 
proponent bears to social and/or historical factors in Latin America.”15 
Criterion (1) is that of originality, and criterion (2) is what Nuccetelli calls “sensitivity to the 
environment,” or what we might think of as a concern with authenticity. If we accept these 
criteria, Nuccetelli claims, then we find a robust body of philosophical work––including works 
by Mariátegui, Martí, and Sarmiento, as well as the 16th Century Spanish historian and 
Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas (chapter 2), self-taught scholar and poet Sor Juana Inés 
de la Cruz (chapter 8), the Venezuelan political leader Simón Bolívar (chapter 3), and the 
Uruguayan essayist Enrique Rodó, to name a few––who each score high in both criteria.  
 
However, Nuccetelli does not stop there. On her view, many more authors should be included in 
the tradition of Latin American philosophy, even though they did not write in standard 
philosophical prose (for a related discussion, see chapter 8). Nuccetelli thus takes up the 
Question of Form and Purpose.  
 
Recall Frondizi’s argument that many of the great works in Latin America do not count as 
philosophy because the thought contained within these works is subordinated to non-
philosophical interests, such as literary or political concerns. In response, Nuccetelli offers a kind 
of argument known as a reductio ad absurdum—a kind of argument which aims to show that a 
certain premise leads to an absurd conclusion. She argues that if we accept Frondizi’s criterion of 
form and purpose, then much of what we currently consider to be canonical works of philosophy 
in the West would be excluded.  
Note that, if applied consistently, it yields startling consequences, for then we should 
have to exclude from philosophy the works of Thomas Hobbes, Saint-Simon, Jeremy 
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Jean-Paul Sartre, John Rawls and many others! 
These works, after all, contain philosophical ideas that are clearly subordinated to their 
authors’ social, political, and literary interests––and so would not qualify as philosophy 
according to [Frondizi’s criterion]. On the other hand, Latin American thinkers...who 
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gave hardly any thought to philosophical issues arising locally in the reality of their own 
societies but devoted themselves instead to alien problems and methods, making no 
significant contribution to them, would count as philosophers… Surely something has 
gone wrong here. (LAT, 533) 
Nuccetelli adds that Frondizi’s criterion would exclude not only these canonical works of 
philosophy, but also “most of what is done today in the flourishing areas of applied philosophy” 
(LAT, 533-534).  
 
With this in mind, Nuccetelli concludes that the distinction between “Latin American thought” 
and “Latin American philosophy” is artificial and ought to be rejected.  
The distinction between philosophical thought and strict philosophy, therefore, seems to 
be an unhelpful contrivance that is better rejected. It doesn’t really matter whether Sor 
Juana’s proclamation of women’s right to knowledge, Acosta’s rebellion against 
Aristotelian science, Mariátegui’s ‘indigenous question,’ and so on are classified as either 
philosophy or philosophical thought, since it is difficult to see how anything of 
importance could hinge on that distinction. In fact, many of the major figures I have 
mentioned here are not by any stretch of the imagination philosophers as they are 
conceived of today. But it is clear that these figures had ideas that are philosophically 
interesting and were often quite astute in their insights related to these ideas even where 
they did not argue rigorously, as philosophers are expected to do now. (LAT, 534) 
Ultimately, Nuccetelli finds that if we expand our conception of philosophy, then it is even more 
obvious that Latin American Philosophy is an original and authentic tradition of philosophy that 
can stand proudly alongside other philosophical traditions.  
 
Decolonial critique and U.S. academic philosophy 
In section one of this chapter, we examined the writings of several Latin American scholars who 
raised the question of whether Latin American philosophy exists. This same question continues 
to be raised in U.S. today, but in the U.S. context, the meaning of the question is typically quite 
different.16 When Mariátegui and Salazar Bondy raised the question, they were concerned with 
whether philosophical thought in Latin American reflected the people of Latin America in an 
original and authentic way. They were identifying the lack of a distinctive philosophy as one of 
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the devastating impacts of colonialism and neocolonialism in Latin America, and their 
skepticism about Latin American philosophy was motivated by a desire to encourage the 
development of Latin American philosophy and the flourishing of Latin America as a whole.  
 
In the U.S., however, the question of whether there is such a thing as Latin American philosophy 
often arises from obliviousness about the philosophical work that has been produced in Latin 
America and incredulity that it could exist. A philosopher raising this question in the U.S. might 
wonder: If Latin American philosophy existed, would I not have learned about it as an 
undergraduate student? Would Latin American philosophy not be included in textbooks on the 
history of philosophy? Would there not be at least one specialist in Latin American philosophy in 
most philosophy departments? If Latin American philosophy existed, would it not be a part of 
the philosophical canon in the United States? In other words, when U.S. philosophers ask 
whether there is Latin American philosophy, the question often has to do with determining 
whether any Latin American philosophy actually lives up to U.S. standards.  
 
Skepticism about the existence of Latin American philosophy in the U.S. thus takes the form of 
preemptive dismissiveness of its importance. In response to this dismissiveness, several 
defenders of Latin American philosophy have answered the skeptical question about its existence 
by turning the question on its head. Rather than asking whether Latin American philosophy 
exists, these philosophers ask: Given the amount of original and broadly interesting and 
impactful philosophical work that has been produced in Latin America, why has it received so 
little attention and respect in the English-speaking world? What are the conditions in the U.S. 
that have led academic philosophers to ignore this valuable work? 
 
Rich discussions have developed in response to questions like these. Scholars have proposed a 
variety of explanations for why Latin American philosophy has been marginalized within the 
discipline and have analyzed the various ways in which this marginalization takes place.17 Many 
of these discussions intersect with the work of feminists and non-Latinx scholars of color who 
have written extensively on the ways that the discipline of philosophy in the U.S. has tended to 
exclude certain histories, philosophical projects, and methods, as well as the participation of 
people of color. 
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With respect to the marginalization of Latin American philosophy in particular, one thread that 
runs through many of these discussions is the recognition of a link between the current 
marginalization of Latin American philosophy in U.S. academia and the long history of Western 
imperialism and colonization.18 A central aspect of the legacy of colonialism is the dominant 
group’s assertion of the superiority of their own ways of knowing and a disparagement of the 
intellectual achievements of colonized peoples. This tendency can take the form of Eurocentric 
prejudice, or the belief that the highest forms of knowledge (and even reason itself!) are a 
product of Western Europe.  
 
Eurocentric prejudice can be found in the version of the history of philosophy that is taught to 
many students in the U.S. These students learn that philosophy began in Ancient Greece and 
reached is culmination in France, Germany, and England, and then in the United States. 
Meanwhile, African, Native American and indigenous, and Spanish-language philosophical 
traditions are effectively erased from the story of philosophy, such that many would be surprised 
to learn that they even exist.19  
 
Beyond this historical erasure, the very ways in which philosophy has come to be defined since 
the mid-20th Century has had the effect––intended or not––of shutting many people out of the 
discipline. Mainstream U.S. philosophers often define philosophy in ways that correspond 
precisely to the ways in which they, Anglo-American philosophers, practice it. They then 
evaluate Latin American philosophy as deficient when it fails to adhere to the standards entailed 
in their definition. This creates a double bind for Latin American philosophy. On the one hand, if 
it is too original––distinct in subject matter or style, for instance––then it risks not being seen as 
real philosophy. On the other hand, if it successfully complies with the conceptual and 
methodological norms of Anglo-American philosophy, this leads some to a double down on the 
criticism that Latin American philosophy is merely imitative.20 As we will see in the final 
section, one project of Latinx philosophy has been to generate ways out of this double bind by 





Metaphilosophical questions similar to those we have considered throughout this chapter have 
emerged in the past several decade surrounding the topic of Latinx philosophy. For example: 
What are the defining characteristics of “Latinx philosophy”? Is Latinx philosophy a distinctive 
tradition of philosophy, and if so, what, if anything, makes it distinctively valuable when 
compared to other philosophical traditions?  
 
The emergence of these metaphilosophical questions about Latinx philosophy may reflect some 
ongoing changes within the discipline of philosophy. While philosophers of Latin American 
descent have historically faced exclusion and marginalization within the profession, there now 
appears to be an increasing number of Latinx professional philosophers, many of whom are 
working on issues related to Latinx and Latin American philosophy. These Latinx philosophers 
are also becoming more organized, as evidenced by the emergence of conferences, journals, and 
an American Philosophical Association newsletter dedicated to Latin American and Latinx 
philosophy. Likewise, there is an increasing number of Latinx students in many colleges and 
universities, and these students are often eager to learn about Latin American and Latinx 
philosophy, creating a demand for the creation of a “Latinx philosophy canon” that can be 
included in syllabi and textbooks (like this one!). At the same time, within the profession as a 
whole, the concern for inclusiveness has become more prominent, and there is a growing interest 
among many philosophers to explore alternatives to what has been the traditional, Eurocentric 
approach to philosophical questions.  
 
In this context, one of the central concerns motivating the desire of some scholars to define 
“Latinx philosophy” is to highlight the distinctive value of Latinx philosophy, and thereby make 
it easier for a group that has been historically marginalized to gain recognition and status within 
the academy. At the same time, these scholars face the challenge of highlighting the value of 
their contributions to the discipline without inadvertently defining philosophy in a way that 
results in the problematic exclusion of other marginalized modes of thought, such as indigenous, 
Afro-Latino, or feminist perspectives. With this in mind, the question that many Latinx 
philosophers are grappling with today is: How can we define “Latinx philosophy” in a way that 
highlights its distinctive value—but without thereby reproducing the harms of exclusion? 
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Consider, for example, the following two ways that the term “Latinx philosophy” might be 
defined. 
● The Ethnic Definition—“Latinx philosophy” includes any work of philosophy produced 
by Latinx people.  
●  The Substantive Definition—“Latinx philosophy” includes any work of philosophy that 
engages with the distinctive concerns of the Latinx community, and/or expresses the 
distinctive life-experiences, perspectives, and styles of the Latinx community.  
Each of these approaches to the definition of “Latinx philosophy” has advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, the Ethnic Definition has the advantage of not excluding any Latinx 
philosophers, regardless of what kind of philosophy they work on. On the other hand, one 
possible disadvantage of this definition is that it would exclude the work of philosophers who are 
not Latinx, even if their work engages directly with the distinctive concerns of the Latinx 
community. More generally, this definition suggests that there is nothing philosophically 
substantive that unifies the work included under the label “Latinx philosophy”—or, indeed, that 
this term does not function as a description of a distinctive tradition of philosophy but, rather, 
functions as a merely demographic category.  
 
Conversely, one advantage of the Substantive Definition is that it would make it easier for 
proponents to show that Latinx philosophy is a distinctive tradition of thought, and one that 
offers valuable perspectives on issues that are important to the Latinx community. However, this 
definition would exclude many works by Latinx philosophers, based on the focus of their work. 
For example, the work of the prominent Latino epistemologist Ernest Sosa would not be 
included as part of the tradition of Latinx philosophy under this definition, because Sosa’s work 
does not engage substantively with the distinctive concerns of the Latinx community or express 
this community’s distinctive life-experiences, perspectives, or styles of thought and expression. 
Another possible disadvantage of the Substantive Definition of “Latinx philosophy” is that it 
seems to require proponents to specify the Latinx community’s distinctive concerns, life-
experiences, perspectives, and styles of expression, in order to determine whether a 
philosopher’s work engages with them. Doing so is quite difficult, however, because the “Latinx 
community” is extremely diverse. It includes people born all over Latin America, as well as 
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people born in the U.S. who have never been to Latin America and do not speak Spanish; it also 
includes people from every social class, political and religious persuasion, sexual orientation, 
and every other dimension of human diversity. With this diversity in mind, we may doubt that it 
is possible to identify anything close to a single “Latinx perspective” on any philosophical 
question.  
 
The authors of this chapter, Francisco Gallegos and Lori Gallegos de Castillo, have addressed 
this issue with regard to one segment of the Latinx community. In their article, “On the 
Distinctive Value of Mexican-American Philosophy” (forthcoming), we argue that although the 
Mexican-American community is extremely diverse, it is possible to identify a common set of 
concerns shared by this group, including concerns about immigration, identity, heritage and 
tradition, language, and recognition, as well as a common set of intuitions shared by this 
community as a whole, including the intuitions that colonial histories shape the present; that the 
plight of the immigrant should elicit empathy; and that the Mexican-American experience is 
complex and manifold. One of our central hesitations with this approach, however, is that it risks 
misinterpreting or excluding the views of particular people who identify as Mexican-American. 
The Mexican-American community is extremely diverse, and it feels dangerous or even 
dogmatic to assert which concerns and intuitions are reflective of the Mexican-American 
community as a whole. This risk is only amplified when we consider the Latinx community, 
which is much larger and more diverse than the Mexican-American community. 
 
Without the pretense of resolving this issue, then, we conclude here by briefly outlining a 
handful of the metaphilosophical themes that have been developed by thinkers who identify as 
Latinx and who have shared their work in self-identifying Latinx philosophical venues in recent 
years. These themes include: 
● Demonstrating to other U.S. philosophers the value of Latin American and Latinx 
philosophy in its own right and in terms of questions of major interest in Anglo-American 
and European philosophy; 
● Working with Latin American philosophers to think transnationally about philosophical 
issues of mutual concern; 
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● Theorizing the nature of the philosophical canon, and pressing for a reconfiguration of 
the canon to include Latin American and Latinx philosophy; 
● Investigating the relationship between disciplinary boundaries and the demographics of 
practitioners; 
● Examining the way in which the discipline of philosophy and academic institutional 
practices perpetuate colonial oppression, and imagining alternative ways of engaging in 
scholarly activity that avoid perpetuating coloniality and are responsive to colonial 
harms; 
● Exploring the way in which coloniality has produced the erasure of knowledges emerging 
out of non-Western frameworks and by non-white thinkers in Latin America; and 
● Moving beyond the discipline of philosophy in order to engage with philosophical 
thought that is not constrained by those disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Given the critical way in which Latinx philosophers have oriented themselves with respect to the 
discipline of philosophy, it is perhaps unsurprising that Latinx philosophy, Latina feminism, and 
decolonial philosophy have emerged as frameworks through which some of the richest and most 
innovative metaphilosophical work is being carried out. Thus, although we leave the question of 
how to define “Latinx philosophy” unanswered, we can identify a central set of questions to 
attend to as this conversation continues: Will the concern with liberation from the persistent and 
oppressive legacies of colonization emerge as the defining characteristic of Latinx philosophy? 
And will this concern lend to Latinx philosophy an original, authentic, and distinctively valuable 
perspective on classical philosophical questions, while simultaneously pushing the boundaries of 
what counts as philosophy? 
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